10 Appendix B

John Cotton’s Defense of the Puritan Persecution of Heretics (Baptists and Quakers) in New England

The following is from John Cotton’s defense of the per­secution of Roger Williams and others in the New World. The Puritans based their treatment of Williams and others on the grounds of religious heresy. Our thesis addresses Cotton’s foundation for his argument. Notice the signifi­cance of the title of Cotton’s article.

THE OLD TESTAMENT IS OF ETERNAL FORCE

By John Cotton

Ceremonial laws were generally typical. Not so Moses his judicials, especially those which had in them moral equity.

It is moral equity that blasphemers and apostate idolaters, seducing others to idolatry, should be put to death …. But the external equity of that judicial law of Moses was of moral force and binds all princes to express that zeal and indig­na­tion, both against blasphemy, in such as fall under their just power … and against seduction to idolatry …

And therefore, it cannot be truly said that the Lord Jesus never appointed the civil sword for a remedy in such cases. For He did expressly appoint it in the Old Testament; nor did he ever abrogate it in the New. The reason of the law (which is the life of the law) is of eternal force and equity in all ages. The reason is of moral, that is, of universal and perpetual eq­uity, to put to death an apostate, seducing idolater, or heretic, who seeks to thrust away the souls of God’s people from the Lord their God …

Did ever any apostle or evangelist make the judicial laws of Moses concerning life and death ceremonial and typical? Time was when human inventions in God’s worship were ac­counted superstition; but now human inventions in doctrine may pass for current Evangelical divinity.

It is true the Son of Righteousness has set up another church, ministry, and worship. But did He ever set up an­other civil righteousness? Or a magistrate to walk by another rule of righteousness than that which God gave by Moses? If it be true that Christ gave no express ordinance, precept, or precedent of killing men by material swords for religion’s sake, it is as true that neither did He for any breach of civil justice, no not for murder nor adultery. Which makes it, therefore, evident that seeing He has expressly authorized civil magistracy in the New Testament and has given no ex­press laws or rules or righteousness for them to walk by in administration of civil justice, therefore either He leaves them to act and rule without a rule (which derogates from the per­fection of Scripture), or else they must fetch their rules of righteousness from the law of Moses and from the Old Tes­tament prophets who have expounded Him in the Old Tes­tament …

For since God laid this charge upon magistrates in the Old Testament to punish seducers and the Lord Jesus never took this charge off in the New Testament, who is this Discusser [Roger Williams] that he should account Paul himself, or an angel from heaven, accursed, that should leave this charge still upon magistrates which God laid on and Christ never took off? …

For Christ came not to destroy the law of Moses (Matthew 5:17) …

No, nor did He come to destroy the judicial laws, such as them as are of moral equity. Or else, the conscience of the civil magistrate could never do any act of civil justice out of faith, because he should have no word of God to be the grounds of his action if the laws of judgment in the Old Testament were abrogated and none extant in the New.[1]

Roger Williams arrived in London in 1645 during the writing of the Westminster Confession. His tale of terror in the New World forced John Cotton to defend himself and the other New England Puritans in their persecution of heretics, mostly Baptists and Quakers. Cotton’s arguments are classical Covenant Theology sacralism. In the minds of many, Cotton’s arguments have no answer unless there is a change of covenants. Notice Cotton’s reasoning:

  1. God commanded heretics to be put to death in the law of Moses. Everyone will agree with this statement.
  2. God’s character has not changed, nor has his law, or stan­dard for defining sin and righteousness, changed. This is the third essential maxim of classical Covenant The­ology concerning one unchanging moral law of God. Cotton vehemently opposes any idea that the Sermon on the Mount, or anything else in the New Covenant Scriptures, adds to or in any way changes the law of Moses. There is one canon of conduct for Israel and the church. Covenant Theology cannot yield on this point.
  3. Cotton admits, “It is true that Christ set up a new church, ministry, and worship.”
  4. Cotton then tightens the noose: “But did He ever set up another civil righteousness? Or did he ever in­struct a magistrate to walk by another rule of right­eousness than that which God gave by Moses? Is it not true that Christ did not come to destroy the Law and the Prophets?”
  5. Everyone agrees that the magistrate in the New Testa­ment Scriptures still has the power of the sword (Rom. 13).
  6. Cotton asks the vital question: “Who tells the magis­trate how to use the sword?”

A. It is obvious that Christ, in the New Covenant Scriptures, never gave any laws directing the mag­istrate’s use of the sword. Who then deserves the sword and for what specific offense? The New Testament Scriptures never say.

B. Cotton presses the truth of his “one covenant, one church, and one canon of conduct” theology to its legitimate conclusion that forces his opponents to do one of the following:

a. We must produce clear evidence in the New Tes­tament Scriptures that instructs the magis­trate today on when and upon whom he is to use the sword, or

b. we must allow the magistrate, or each society, to make up their own laws, or

c. the magistrate must use the rules that Christ has already given his church through Moses (Remem­ber that Israel is the church and therefore the church is under the same rule of conduct as is Israel).

On the surface, Cotton’s logic seems airtight. He insists that either (1) we must deny the validity of both God’s holy unchanging nature and his holy unchanging law;[2] or (2) we must use the same sword for the same sins that God commanded the church under Moses to use on heretics. Cotton’s argument, however, is flawed. He creates a false dichotomy and appeals to the law of the excluded middle. He fails to consider the option of a New Covenant. Cotton could not see that the church is under a new and gracious covenant that does not permit her to punish anyone, even her own members, with a sword. Likewise, the church can excommunicate church members, but she cannot judge and punish the world (1 Cor. 5:12). Sacralism, the wedding of church and state, denies the reality of a New Covenant that brings new laws. It confuses and merges church and state as if the old theocracy were still in place under a new name.

Cotton’s case is irrefutable without a change of cove­nants. If the church is under the same covenant that Israel was under, then the New England Puritans were more than justified in whipping, imprisoning, and in some instances, putting to death Baptists and other “heretics.” They had the theology of the Westminster Confession of Faith solidly on their side. This is one reason why some current Presbyteri­ans have trouble dealing with the issue of Theonomy within their ranks. The Theonomists have both history and the Westminster Confession of Faith on their side. A consis­tent application of the tenet of one covenant for one people under one canon of conduct in all times must allow the law of Moses to direct the magistrate’s use of the sword in ecclesiastical matters as well as civil.


  1. John Cotton, The Bloudy Tenent, Washed White in the Bloud of the Lamb (1647; repr., New York: Arno Press, 1972), 55, 67, 177-78, 181-82, 193.
  2. If we attempt to use Covenant Theology’s three divisions of the law (moral, judicial, and ceremonial), we face several problems. One, those divisions have no textual basis in Scripture, and two, one of the specific laws in the Sermon on the Mount that Jesus “came not to destroy” was a judicial law (Matthew 5:38, 39) that had nothing to do with the so-called moral law.